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Abstract
Key distribution protocols allow the secure distribution of cryptographic key material amongst two
parties, Alice and Bob. If these protocol exploit quantum mechanical properties they are referred to as
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols. QKD protocols can be shown to be information theoret-
ically secure. However, implementing these protocols requires the manipulation and communication of
quantum information, which raises a number of challenges. The measurement or detection devices in
QKD implementations are very sensitive and the slightest deviations from the theoretical behavior can
results in erroneous results. Moreover, quantum communication channels are subject to significant losses.
For these reasons, it is challenging to evaluate QKD protocols over large distances and optimizing the
performance of a QKD implementation is an important task.
In this work we consider the performance optimization of the Decoy-State BB84 QKD protocol,
i.e., finding optimal protocol parameters. This optimization problem requires a security analysis and
a physical model for the different components of the implementation. To simplify the analysis and
optimization problem, various heuristic assumptions are typically made.
We follow a more rigorous approach and formally describe the linear and non-linear programs de-
scribing the optimization problem. As a result we are able to omit a number of heuristic assumptions
and improve the performance of the Decoy-State BB84 QKD protocol by instantiating it with optimized
protocol parameter. We show that some of these assumptions are too restrictive and limit the achievable
performance.
1 Introduction
The use of quantum information to securely distribute symmetric cryptographic keys was first proposed in
1984 by Bennett and Brassard [BB84] and today their BB84 protocol is still, without doubt, the best-known
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol that exists. Since then, much progress has been made and the first
QKD systems are already commercially available. Thereby, QKD has become one of the first applications
of quantum mechanics at an individual quanta level [GRTZ02].
The goal of a key-distribution protocol is for two parties, Alice and Bob, to agree on a key k ∈ {0, 1}n over
an insecure communication channel, such that even an adversary Eve with full control over this communica-
tion channel can only obtain a negligible amount of information about this key k. If Alice and Bob are capable
of communicating quantum information, they are able to achieve information-theoretic or unconditional se-
curity, i.e., security against adversaries with unlimited computational power. The information-theoretic
security of the BB84 protocol against the most general attacks allowed by quantum mechanics was proven
in 1996 by Mayers [May96].
In general, Mayers’ security notion does not imply that the derived key can securely be used in other
cryptographic protocols [BHL+05] and a stronger notion of security following the universal composability
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framework is required [Can01]. Informally, universal security is proven by comparing the output of the
protocol to the output of an ideal key-distribution protocol, i.e., a perfect key. If these two outputs are
indistinguishable, the protocol is said to be universally secure. Fortunately, QKD protocols that satisfy
Mayers’ weaker notion of security were shown to be universally secure [BHL+05].
Practical implementations deviate from the theoretical BB84 protocol, which may render them insecure.
As any realistic quantum channel introduces noise, i.e., quantum information is lost or altered by imper-
fections in the source, channel and detector. These benign losses and errors are indistinguishable from the
ones introduced by an adversary. For this reason, the conservative assumption is made that all losses and
errors are caused by an adversary. Mayers’ proof already considered noisy quantum channels and shows that
the BB84 protocol is information-theoretically secure as long as the noise level is below a certain thresh-
old [May96]. In contrast to the ideal BB84 protocol, practical implementations therefore require an error
correction procedure.
In addition, the original BB84 protocol requires Alice and Bob to communicate individual qubits encoded
in, for example, photons. Single photons are hard to produce and, for this reason, the quantum information
is often encoded in weak laser pulses. The number of photons in each of these laser pulses follows a Poisson
distribution with an attunable mean µ, also called the intensity of the source. Hence, laser pulses can
contain multiple photons, a deviation from the original BB84 protocol that can be exploited via the photon-
number-splitting (PNS) attack [BLMS00]. For this reason we must assume that all key material derived
from multi-photon pulses is compromised. Privacy amplification is applied to establish a secret key from
such a partially compromised key.
The performance of a QKD implementation can be quantified by the key-rate R. The key-rate of a QKD
implementation is the size of the secure key divided by N , the number of pulses that were sent. The key-rate
depends on the noise, but also on the intensity µ. This intensity is attunable, hence it can be chosen to
maximize the key-rate R. In fact, the protocol does not require the intensity to be fixed throughout the
protocol. On the contrary, it has been shown to be beneficial to randomly vary the intensity µ between
pulses, resulting in the so-called decoy-state BB84 protocol [Hwa03].
This work focuses on the security analysis of the decoy-state BB84 protocol. The analysis is based on
the uncertainty relation for smooth entropies [TR11]. In [TLGR12] the uncertainty relation was applied
to the analysis of the BB84 protocol implemented with a perfect single photon source. This analysis was
extended to the decoy-state BB84 protocol in which weak pulsed laser sources with attunable intensities are
applied [LCW+14]. The analysis of [LCW+14] restricts itself to the case where the intensities are randomly
varied between three different levels. The intensities and sample distribution are chosen to optimize the
key-rate that is achieved in a specific set-up. This approach can be generalized to arbitrary numbers of
intensities resulting in a larger search space over which the key-rate is optimized.
Our main contribution lies in the formulation of the key-rate optimization problem. Since the assumption
must be made that all multi-photon pulses are compromised by an adversary performing a PNS attack the
key-rate depends on the amount of detection events corresponding to vacuum or single-photon pulses and
the errors in these events. These quantities cannot be observed and therefore must be lower bounded based
on observations that can be made by Alice and Bob. Since we assume the photon numbers to follow a
Poisson distribution, analytical lower bounds can be found [MQZL05, LCW+14]. However, these bounds
are non-tight. In general, tight lower bounds follow from solving a linear program. We have found that the
latter approach can result in an improved security analysis.
We formulate a linear program to determine lower bounds on the number of vacuum and single photon
pulses, as well as upper bounds on the number of single-photon errors. Then we determine a lower bound
on the key-rate corresponding to a particular parameter setting, which we then optimize using constrained
non-linear optimization techniques [CGT00]. This approach allows for a larger search space compared to
analytical models. This approach furthermore allows us to omit often made assumptions. For instance, the
sifting probabilities for Alice and Bob, that may differ from each other.
Another benefit is that we improve the lower bounds by including vacuum and single photon pulses in
a single linear program, whereas in current literature, lower bounds for the two are computed separately,
resulting in conservative estimates. Other heuristic assumptions are also overcome with this approach, such
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as the number of decoy states, or fixing one or more intensities.
We show that these improvements result in an improved obtainable secure key-rate. We furthermore show
the effects of using more decoy states and the effects of increasing the number of sent pulses. We first explain
the BB84 protocol in Section 2 and the security and robustness of the protocol in Section 3. Afterwards,
Section 4 explains how to obtain secure key-material from a BB84 protocol execution and finite key-effects
are introduced. In Section 5 we explain how to optimize the secure key-rate and how to incorporate the used
quantum channel in our model. Results of our model are presented in Section 6.
2 Decoy-state BB84 protocol
Alice and Bob are assumed to have access to a (noisy) quantum channel and an authenticated classical
channel. Both channels are insecure and can be fully controlled by the adversary, however, active attacks on
the classical channel are assumed to be immediately detected as this channel is authenticated.
In the following, all keys are denoted by an uppercase K and the superscripts refer to the party Alice a
or Bob b and type of key: raw r, sifted s or error-corrected e. The decoy-state BB84 protocol now goes as
follows.
Preparation: Alice generates a raw key by sampling a uniformly random bit string in Kra ∈ {0, 1}N .
Moreover, Alice samples a random basis string X a ∈ {X,Z}N , where P (X ai = X) = pX for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
For all i she encodes bit Krai in basis X ai resulting in a sequence of qubits in {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}N .
Communication: For all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , Alice samples an intensity Ui from a probability distribution
PUi|Xai conditioned on the chosen basis X ai ∈ {X,Z}. The distribution PUi|Xai is independent of the index
i and for both bases its support lies in a finite set of intensities {µ0, . . . , µm}. Alice encodes the associated
qubit in a laser pulse with intensity Ui and sends this pulse to Bob over the quantum channel.
Measurement: Bob samples a random basis string X b ∈ {X,Z}N , where P (X bi = X) = pX for all
1 ≤ i ≤ N and measures pulse i in basis X bi . If both of Bob’s detectors register an event, for example in
the case of a multi-photon pulse and a measurement incompatible with Alice’s preparation, Bob randomly
selects a measurement outcome Krbi ∈ {0, 1}. It can also occur that no detector registers an event, in this
case Bob defines the outcome to be ∅. As a result Bob obtains his raw key Krb ∈ {0, 1, ∅}N . Note that Bob’s
sifting probability pbX is equal to that of Alice p
a
X , i.e., p
a
X = p
b
X = pX . This is not required, but it can be
shown that for all protocol instantiations with paX 6= pbX , there exists a protocol instance with paX = pbX with
at least the same secure key-rate.
Sifting: Alice and Bob announce their basis choices and Bob announces the pulses for which no detection
event took place. The pulses that were prepared and measured in the same basis and for which a detection
event occurred, are sifted from the raw keys Kra and Krb and Alice and Bob obtain sifted keys Ksa ∈ {0, 1}ns
and Ksb ∈ {0, 1}ns respectively. In addition, we let KsaX ,KsbX ∈ {0, 1}nX be the strings containing the bits
of Ksa and Ksb obtained by preparing and measuring in the X -basis for X ∈ {X,Z}.
Parameter estimation: Alice announces the chosen intensities U , which allows Alice and Bob to
compute the amount of detection events
nµj ,X =
∣∣{i : X ai = X bi = X ∧ Ui = µj ∧Krbi 6= ∅}∣∣ , (1)
for all intensities µj and for both bases X ∈ {X,Z}. In addition, Alice and Bob reveal the parts of the sifted
keys KsaZ ,K
sb
Z ∈ {0, 1}nZ . Using this information they can compute the amount of errors in the Z-basis
Eµj ,Z =
∣∣{i : X ai = X bi = Z ∧ Ui = µj ∧ (KsaZ )i 6= (KsbZ )i}∣∣ , (2)
for all intensities µj . Given these values Alice and Bob determine upper-bounds on the number of bits in K
sa
X
that are associated to multi-photon events and the error-rate e1,Z for single photon pulses in the Z-basis.
From these bounds Alice and Bob determine the length ` of the secret key that can be extracted after the
error reconciliation phase. If ` ≤ 0 the protocol aborts. Note that only the Z-events are used to determine `.
The X-events will be used in the error reconciliation and privacy amplification phase to construct the final
key.
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Error reconciliation: Errors in the quantum channel can cause the strings KsaX and K
sb
X to be distinct.
For this reason Alice and Bob perform an information reconciliation protocol by which they obtain error-
corrected keys Kea,Keb ∈ {0, 1}nX respectively.
Verification: Alice samples a uniformly random hash function h from a two-universal family of hash
functions Fe [CW79] mapping {0, 1}nX to {0, 1}d− log2(cor)e. Here 0 ≤ 1− cor ≤ 1 is a lower bound on the
probability that the protocol is correct, i.e., that Alice and Bob will obtain identical keys. Alice applies this
hash function to her error-corrected key Kea. She sends the hash-function h and hash-value h(Kea) to Bob,
who then computes h(Keb). If h(Kea) 6= h(Keb), the protocol aborts.
Privacy Amplification: Alice samples a uniformly random hash function h from a two-universal family
Fp mapping {0, 1}nX to {0, 1}` and announces h to Bob, where ` has been determined in the parameter
estimation phase. Both Alice and Bob compute the secret keys Ka = h(Kea) and Kb = h(Keb) respectively.
3 Correctness and robustness
A QKD protocol should be correct and secure against any attack allowed by quantum mechanics. Moreover,
the protocol should only abort with a small probability, i.e., it should be robust. In this section we formalize
the correctness and robustness properties, following the approach of [Ren05], and show why the decoy-state
BB84 protocol admits these properties. The security of the protocol will be analyzed in Section 4.
A QKD protocol is cor-correct if
P (Ka 6= Kb) ≤ cor, (3)
for all possible strategies of an adversary. This property is easily seen to be satisfied if in the verification
phase Fe is indeed a family of two-universal hash functions mapping {0, 1}nX to {0, 1}d− log2(cor)e. The hash
value reveals ⌈
log2
(
1
cor
)⌉
≤ log2
(
2
cor
)
(4)
bits of information to the adversary.
Note that the protocol is allowed to abort, in which case Ka = Kb = ⊥. The probability pabort that the
protocol aborts in the absence of an adversary, depends on the error reconciliation protocol that is applied.
For any δec > 0, there exist error reconciliation protocols that leak at most
nX (h(eX) + δec) (5)
bits of information [Ren05], where h is the binary entropy function and eX is the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) of the sifted keys in the X-basis. Moreover,
pabort ≤ P
(
Kea 6= Keb) ≤ 2 exp( −nXδ2ec
3 log2(5)
2
)
, (6)
where the last inequality follows from Corollary 6.3.5 of [Ren05]. To achieve an abort probability of at most
pabort we therefore take
δec(pabort, nX) =
√
ln
(
2
pabort
)
3 log2(5)
2
nX
. (7)
4 Secure key length
To evaluate the security of the protocol let us consider the joint state of the classical random variable
K := Ka with support K and the adversary’s quantum system
ρKE =
∑
x∈K
P (K = x) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρxE , (8)
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where ρxE is the state of the adversary’s system given thatK = x. Ideally, the classical probability distribution
P (K = x) is uniform and the adversary’s state is independent of K. Hence, the joint state of a perfect key
and the adversary’s system is given by
1
|K|
∑
x∈K
|x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρE . (9)
A QKD-protocol is now said to be sec-secure if
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ρKE − 1|K|∑
x∈K
|x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ sec, (10)
where ‖A‖1 = tr
(√
A∗A
)
is the trace norm of the complex matrix A.
If a QKD-protocol is sec-secure the output cannot be distinguished from that of a perfect protocol with
probability more than sec [Ren05]. Moreover this security definition ensures universal composability, i.e.,
the key K can safely be used in other cryptographic protocols.
In general, Alice’s bit-string Kea ∈ {0, 1}nX , obtained after the error correction and verification phase,
does not satisfy the above security definition. For this reason privacy amplification is applied. From the
leftover hash lemma [TSSR11] it follows that the QKD protocol is sec-secure if there exists an  ≥ 0 such
that
` =
⌊
Hmin(K
ea|E)− 2 log2
(
1
2(sec − )
)⌋
, (11)
where Hmin(K
ea|E) is the smooth min-entropy of the random variable Kea conditioned on the adversary’s
(quantum) information E. The leftover hash lemma thus gives an expression of the bit-length ` of the secure
key K in terms of this conditional smooth entropy.
The error corrected key is obtained from the sifted key after performing the error correction and verifi-
cation phase, which both leak some information to the adversary. If we let Es be the adversary’s (quantum)
information after the sifting phase, it follows from Equations (4) and (5) that
Hmin(K
ea|E) ≥Hmin(KsaX |Es)− nX (h(EX) + δec(pabort, nX))− log2
(
2
cor
)
. (12)
Now observe that the bits of KsaX are all derived from vacuum, single-photon or multi-photon pulses.
Hence, we can write
KsaX = K
sa
0,X ⊗Ksa1,X ⊗Ksam,X , (13)
where Ksa0,X , K
sa
1,X and K
sa
m,X contain the bits associated to the vacuum, single-photon and multi-photon
pulses, respectively.
It is impossible for an adversary to obtain information about the bits associated to vacuum pulses, hence
for all  ≥ 0
Hmin(K
sa
0,X |Es) ≥ Hmin(Ksa0,X |Es) = n0,X , (14)
where n0,X is the number of vacuum pulses that were sent. In contrast, the PNS attack allows the adversary
to obtain all information about the bits associated to multi-photon pulses. Hence, for all  ≥ 0 we must
lower bound the associated min-entropy as follows
Hmin(K
sa
m,X |Ksa0,XEs) ≥ 0. (15)
Applying the chain rule for smooth min-entropies [VDTR13] twice and plugging in Equations (14)
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and (15), we find that for all , 1, 4, 5 ≥ 0 and 2, 3 > 0 such that 21 + 2 + 3 + 24 + 5 =  ≤ 1,
Hmin(K
sa
X |Es) ≥ H5min(Ksa0,X |Es) +H1min(Ksa1,X |E˜) +H4min(Ksam,X |Ksa0,XEs)
− log2
(
1
1−
√
1− 22
)
− log2
(
1
1−
√
1− 23
)
≥ n0,X +H1min(Ksa1,X |E˜)− log2
(
1
1−
√
1− 22
)
− log2
(
1
1−
√
1− 23
)
≥ n0,X +H1min(Ksa1,X |E˜)− 2 log2
(
2
23
)
,
(16)
where E˜ = Ksa0,X ⊗Ksam,X ⊗ Es and for the third inequality we use that for all x ≤ 1 it holds that
1−√1− x ≥ x
2
.
See also [LCW+14] in which the same lower bound is derived.
Hence, combining Equations (11), (12) and (16) gives an achievable secure key-rate in terms of the smooth
min-entropy of the n1,X single-photon pulses in the X-basis conditioned on the quantum system E˜. For
these pulses we have the following uncertainty relation [TR11],
H1min(K
sa
1,X |E˜) ≥ n1,X −H1max(Lsa1,Z |Lsb1,Z), (17)
where Lsa1,Z and L
sb
1,Z are the hypothetical sifted keys that would have been obtained if Alice and Bob would
have prepared and measured the Ksa1,X -pulses in the Z-basis. Informally, this uncertainty relation states that
either Eve is uncertain about Alice’s key in the X-basis or Alice and Bob observe a high amount of errors
in their Z-events.
Let eL1,Z be the fraction of errors between L
sa
1,Z and L
sb
1,Z and let e1,Z be the fraction of errors between
Ksa1,Z and K
sb
1,Z . The total fraction of single-photon errors that would have been obtained if Alice and Bob
had prepared and measured all these pulses in the Z-basis then equals
etot1,Z =
nXe
L
1,Z + nZe1,Z
nX + nZ
. (18)
The amount of errors nZe1,Z can now be seen to be equal to the number of errors in a subset of size nZ
randomly sampled from a set of size nX + nZ containing (nX + nZ)e
tot
1,Z errors. Hence, nZe1,Z follows a
hypergeometric distribution and
P
(
eL1,Z ≥ e1,Z + δ
)
= P
(
nZe1,Z ≤ nZetot1,Z −
nXnZδ
nX + nZ
)
,
≤ exp
( −2n2XnZδ2
(nX + nZ) (nX + 1)
)
,
(19)
where the inequality follows by applying Serfling’s tail bound of the hypergeometric distribution [Ser74]. This
upper bound is slightly different from that of [TLGR12]. If nX ≥ nZ , then Equation (19) gives a tighter
upper bound than [TLGR12], but the difference between the two bounds is negligible. By Equation (19) the
event that an adversary correctly guesses the basis choices is taken into account for example.
If we now take
δ = δ(nX , nZ , 1) =
√
(nX + nZ)(nX + 1)
2n2XnZ
ln
(
1
1
)
, (20)
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we find that P
(
eL1,Z ≥ e1,Z + δ
) ≤ 1. It now follows that
H1max(L
sa
1,Z |Lsb1,Z) ≤ n1,X h¯ (e1,Z + δ(nX , nZ , 1)) , (21)
were h¯(p) = h (min (p, 1/2)) for the binary entropy function h (Lemma 3 of [TLGR12]). Note that in the
asymptotic limit, i.e., nX , nZ →∞, the term δ vanishes.
Altogether, we thus find that the QKD protocol is sec-secure if
` =
⌊
n0,X + n1,X − n1,X h¯ (e1,Z + δ(nX , nZ , 1))
− nX (h(eX) + δec (pabort, nX))− log2
(
2
cor(23(sec − ))2
)⌋
,
(22)
for some 1, 2, 3 > 0 and  = 21 + 2 + 3. The values , 2, 3 can be chosen to maximize the length ` of
the secure key. Note that this key-length is conditioned on the fact that the protocol does not abort. The
expected key rate of the protocol is therefore given by,
R =
1− pabort
N
⌊
n0,X + n1,X − n1,X h¯ (e1,Z + δ(nX , nZ , 1))
− nX (h(eX) + δec (pabort, nX))− log2
(
2
cor(23(sec − ))2
)⌋
,
(23)
4.1 Unknown parameters
Some of the parameters, such as the amount of successful detection events nX in the X-basis, in the key
rate expression of Equation 23 can be observed by Alice and Bob during the execution of the QKD protocol.
However, Alice and Bob remain oblivious to other parameter values in this expression. For instance, we
assume that Alice and Bob can not distinguish between single and multi-photon events. For this reason,
they can not determine the number of single photon events nX,0 in the X-basis. To this end, Alice and Bob
resort to upper and lower bounds for these unknown parameter values. In this section we describe the linear
programs that are used to find these bounds.
Let us first consider the different parameters of Equation 23. The amount of successful detections nX in
the X-basis and the QBER eX can be observed by Alice and Bob. The QBER eX can be estimated before
running the QKD protocol, hence no key material has to be sacrificed to estimate this value. A different
QBER during the QKD protocol, possibly due to adversarial behavior, will not compromise the security,
but merely influence the abort probability of the protocol. Note that the adversary, controlling the quantum
channel, is always capable of aborting the protocol, i.e., performing a denial-of-service attack. Since Alice
and Bob are unable to determine the amount of photons per pulse, the variables n0,X , n1,X and e1,X remain
unknown. For this reason the observable quantities nµj ,X (Equation (1)) and Eµj ,Z (Equation (2)) for all
intensities µj and both bases X are used to upper bound the error rate e1,Z and to lower bound the expression
n0,X + n1,X − n1,X h¯ (e1,Z + δ(nX , nZ , 1)). These bounds result in lower bounds on the secure key length `.
Let nl,X be the amount of l-photon pulses detected by Bob and prepared and measured in the X -basis.
Then, for 0 ≤ j ≤ m, it holds that the expected number of X -pulses sent with intensity µj equals
E
[
nµj ,X
]
=
∞∑
l=0
pµj |l,Xnl,X , (24)
where pµj |l,X is the probability that an l-photon pulse is sent with intensity µj given that Alice and Bob
chose basis X . Since the amount of photons in a weak laser pulse follows a Poisson distribution, we find by
Bayes’ rule that,
pµj |l,X =
e−µjµlj
l!
pµj |X
pl|X
, (25)
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where pµj |X is the probability that an X -pulse is sent with intensity µj and
pl|X =
m∑
j=0
pµj |X e
−µjµlj
l!
, (26)
is the probability that an X -pulse consists of l photons [MQZL05, LCW+14].
In addition, the number of l-photon pulses in the X basis nl,X that result in a detection event is upper
bounded by the number of l-photon pulses Nl,X sent by Alice and measured by Bob in the X -basis. Note
that we use an uppercase N to denote the amount of pulses sent by Alice and a lowercase n to denote the
number of events detected by Bob. Hence,
nl,X ≤ Nl,X and E [Nl,X ] = pl|XNX , (27)
for all l ≥ 0 and for all X ∈ {X,Z}.
Alice and Bob cannot exactly determine the values nl,X , but Equations (25) and (27) do supply them
with constraints on these values. The variables nµj ,X are measured in the parameter estimation phase. In
the asymptotic limit these estimations are equal to their expected values. Hence, neglecting finite key effects,
we can find a lower bound n∗1,Z for n1,Z by solving the following linear program over the unknown variables
nl,Z for l ≥ 0.
n∗1,Z = min n1,Z ,
s.t. nµj ,Z = e
−µjpµj |Z
∞∑
l=0
µlj
l!
nl,Z
pl|Z
, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
0 ≤ nl,Z ≤ pl|ZNZ , ∀l ≥ 0.
(28)
However, in all practical situations the amount of pulses is finite and the finite key effects cannot be
neglected. By Hoeffding’s bounds [Hoe63] we find that
P
(∣∣nµj ,X − E [nµj ,X ]∣∣ ≥√− ln(Hµj/2)nX /2
)
≤ Hµj ,X , (29)
for all 0 ≤ j ≤ m, X ∈ {X,Z} and Hµj > 0. Since the variables Nl,X are sums of Bernoulli random variables
we can apply Chernoff’s bounds [Che52]. In this effort, let us define the following function,
f : Z≥0 × [0, 1]× (0, 1]→ R≥0 →, (N, p, ) 7→ − ln()
(
1 +
√
1− 2pN
ln()
)
. (30)
Then by Chernoff’s bound,
P
(
Nl,X ≥ E [Nl,X ] + f(NX ; pl|X ; Cl,X )
) ≤ Cl,X , (31)
for all l ≥ 0, X ∈ {X,Z} and Cl,Z > 0.
Hence, a lower bound n∗1,Z of n1,Z , that holds except with probability at most
∑∞
l=0 
C
l,Z +
∑m
j=0 
H
µj ,Z
,
is given by the linear program of Equation (32).
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n∗1,Z = min n1,Z ,
s.t. nµj ,Z + δµj = e
−µjpµj |Z
∞∑
l=0
µlj
l!
nl,Z
pl|Z
, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
m∑
j=0
δµj = 0,
0 ≤ nl,Z ≤ min
(
pl|ZNZ + f(NZ ; pl|Z ; Cl,Z), nZ
)
, ∀l ≥ 0,∣∣δµj ∣∣ ≤√− ln(Hµj ,Z/2)nZ/2, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
nl,z, δµj ∈ R, ∀l ≥ 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
(32)
Similarly, an upper bound E∗1,Z , that holds except with probability at most
∑∞
l=0 
C
l,Z +
∑m
j=0 
H
µj ,E
, of
the number of errors in single-photon Z-pulses E1,Z is found by solving the linear program of Equation (33).
E∗1,Z = max E1,Z
s.t. Eµj ,Z + δµj = e
−µjpµj |Z
∞∑
l=0
µlj
l!
El,Z
pl|Z
, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
m∑
j=0
δµj = 0,
0 ≤ El,Z ≤ min
(
pl|ZNZ + f(NZ ; pl|Z ; Cl,Z), EZ
)
, ∀l ≥ 0.∣∣δµj ∣∣ ≤√− ln(Hµj ,E/2)EZ/2, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
El,z, δµj ∈ R, ∀l ≥ 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
(33)
It follows that
e1,Z ≤ e∗1,Z = min
(
E∗1,Z
n∗1,Z
,
1
2
)
(34)
except with probability at most
e =
∞∑
l=0
Cl,Z +
m∑
j=0
(
Hµj ,Z + 
H
µj ,E
)
. (35)
Finally, a lower bound n∗0,1,X of the expression
n0,X + n1,X − n1,X h¯
(
e∗1,Z + δ(nX , nZ , 1)
)
, (36)
that holds except with probability at most X =
∑∞
l=0 
C
l,X +
∑m
j=0 
H
µj ,X
, is found by solving the linear
program of Equation (37).
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n∗0,1,X = min n0,X + n1,X − n1,Xh(e∗1,Z + δ(nX , nZ , 1)),
s.t. nµj ,X + δµj = e
−µjpµj |X
∞∑
l=0
µlj
l!
nl,X
pl|X
, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
m∑
j=0
δµj = 0,
0 ≤ nl,X ≤ min
(
pl|XNX + f(NX ; pl|X ; Cl,X), nX
)
, ∀l ≥ 0,∣∣δµj ∣∣ ≤√− ln(Hµj ,X/2)nX/2, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
nl,X , δµj ∈ R, ∀l ≥ 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
(37)
A detail that has been omitted so far is the fact that these linear programs contain an infinite number of
variables, which can be dealt with by truncating the infinite sums at M . For the resulting linear programs,
with a finite number of variables, we refer to Appendix B. The same truncation applies to the error terms
X and e, i.e.,
X =
M∑
l=0
Cl,X +
m∑
j=0
Hµj ,X ,
e =
M∑
l=0
Cl,Z +
m∑
j=0
(
Hµj ,Z + 
H
µj ,E
)
.
(38)
In addition, the truncation introduces two additional error probabilities M,X and M,Z . Altogether it follows,
from solving the linear programs of Equations (54), (55) and (56) in Appendix B, that the expected key rate
equals
R =
1− pabort
N
⌊(
n∗0,1,X − nX (h(eX) + δec (pabort, nX))− log2
(
2
cor(23(sec − ))2
))⌋
, (39)
where 1, 2, 3 > 0 are arbitrary values such that  = 21 + 2 + 3 + e + X + M,X + M,Z .
5 Key-rate optimization
The previous section describes how to compute the key-rate for a given execution of the BB84 protocol.
Hence, given the protocol parameters, the number of detection events (Equation 1) and the number of errors
(Equation 2), the secure key-rate R can be computed by solving three linear programs.
Next, our objective is to maximize this key rate R by choosing optimal protocol parameters µj and pµj ,X
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m and X ∈ {X,Z}. To this end, we model the quantum channel such that the expected number
of detection events and errors can be computed as function of the protocol parameters. The physical model
is the final step to find the protocol parameter values that optimize secure key-rate R. This optimal key-rate
may be found by using the following non-linear optimization program:
min R,
s.t.
m∑
j=0
pµj ,X + pµj ,Z = 1,
µj ≥ 0, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
0 ≤ pµj ,X ≤ 1, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,X ∈ {X,Z} .
(40)
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We obtain the solution of this non-linear optimization program by applying the constrained non-linear
optimization techniques of [CGT00].
5.1 Quantum channel
We consider a QKD system in which Alice encodes qubits in the polarization of photons and transmits them
over a fiber optic cable to Bob. The fiber optic cable is assumed to have an attenuation of α dB/km, i.e., a
channel efficiency of ηch = 10
−αx/10 for distance x km [LCW+14]. The channel efficiency equals the fraction
of photons that arrive at Bob’s detection apparatus, which we assume to be independent of the polarization.
In addition to photon losses on the channel, losses can occur in Bob’s detection apparatus. These losses are
captured by the detector efficiency ηd. The efficiency of the system with a quantum channel of length x is
therefore given by
ηsys = ηchηd = 10
−αx/10ηd. (41)
Bob’s detection apparatus has to be capable of detecting individual photons and is therefore very sensitive.
In fact, the photon detectors might click even when they are not illuminated. These events are called dark
counts and the probability that a detector clicks without being illuminated is called the dark count probability
pdark. Recall that Bob’s detection apparatus contains two single photon detectors, one for each measurement
outcome. Together with the fact that the number of photons in each intensity µj pulse follows a Poisson
distribution with mean µj , we can derive the following expressing for the gain of µj-pulses in this quantum
channel,
Qµj = 1− (1− pdark)2e−µjηsys . (42)
The gain Qµj indicates the fraction of µj-pulses that result in a detection event. For a proper derivation
of this expression we refer to [LCW+14]. From the gain we easily obtain the expected number of detection
events as described in the parameter estimation phase (Equation (1)),
nµj ,X = Npµj ,XQµj . (43)
Recall that N is the total number of pulses that is sent and pµj ,X is the probability that Alice chooses basis
X and intensity µj .
To model the errors we assume that they are either caused by optical errors in the polarization or by
dark counts. Optical errors are modeled by assuming that the polarization of photons is always rotated by
an angle 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi/4. Hence, when Alice sends the qubit |0〉, Bob receives qubit cos(θ) |0〉 + sin(θ) |0〉.
In practice, the polarization error is different per pulse and the angle θ represents an upper bound on the
polarization error. Moreover, θ = pi/4 results in worst-case behavior, explaining why θ ranges from 0 to pi/4.
Dark counts introduce errors since the associated detection events are independent of the polarization
chosen by Alice. Hence, any dark-count event results in an error with probability of 1/2. Altogether, the
expected number of errors for µj-pulses in the X basis is,
Eµj ,X =
Npµj ,X
2
(
1 + (1− pdark)
(
e−µjηsys cos
2 θ − e−µjηsys sin2 θ
)
− (1− pdark)2e−µjηsys
)
. (44)
In this section polarization encoded qubits transmitted over a fiber optic cable were considered. In
practice, qubits transmitted over fiber optic cables are often phase encoded [TRT93]. In contrast, polarization
encoding is mostly used to transmit over free space optical communication channels. Considering, these and
other quantum channels requires some (minor) modifications to the physical model.
6 Results
In this section we present the results of our key-rate optimization approach. We start by comparing the
results from our model to the results presented in [LCW+14]. Afterwards, we consider the effects of increasing
the number of pulses sent and increasing the number of intensities used. We denote the number intensity
settings by m and number of pulses sent by N .
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Figure 1: The maximum achievable secure key-rate using our model compared to
the maximum rate using the model of [LCW+14]. We discard finite key-effects
and for our model, we also present the optimal intensity settings per distance.
Our experiments comprise three regimes. As baseline regime we compare our approach using the param-
eter settings from [LCW+14]. The baseline considers a finite number of intensities m = 3 and ignores finite
key effects N → ∞ as depicted in Figure 1. Please note that in contrast to [LCW+14], we do not fix any
of the used intensity settings. The second regime considers a finite number of intensity settings (m = 3),
and explores the impact of finite key effects by varying the number of pulses N ∈ {107, 108, 109, 1010, 1011}.
For comparison, we include our result from the baseline regime (where N →∞) as depicted in Figure 2. In
the third regime we vary the number of intensity settings, while discarding finite key effects, i.e., N → ∞.
The third regime includes the fully asymptotic case where both m → ∞ and N → ∞. This is depicted in
Figure 3.
6.1 Baseline
For the basline regime we adopt the following parameter settings from [LCW+14]:
• We fix the dark count probability pdark = 6 · 10−7 and the detector efficiency ηd = 0.1.
• For the misalignment we take θ = 0.0707, with corresponding probability emis = 5 · 10−3.
• We model the fiber optic channel with attenuation α = 0.2 dB/km.
We only compare the results for the asymptotic case, because the results for finite number of pulses are
incomparable. In contrast to [LCW+14] we fix the number of pulses sent, while in [LCW+14] the post-
processing block-size is fixed. To keep the same post-processing length a higher number of pulses needs to
be emitted for larger distances.
Our results for the asymptotic case are shown in Figure 1. Both the maximum achievable secure key-rate
(Figure 1a) and the optimal intensity settings (Figure 1b) are presented. In order to compute a lower bound
for the secure key rate we apply the LP’s of Section 4.1. However these contain infinite sums and assume
finite key sizes. We refer to Appendix C.1 for the LP formulations that discard finite key effects and truncate
the infinite sums. Note that the optimal intensities vary for different channel distances and that, in contrast
to [LCW+14], fixing one of these intensities is sub-optimal.
With our model the maximum achievable key-rate is higher. However, we did not take into account the
after-pulse probability. Depending on the magnitude of this error source, the results of our model may be
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closer to those of [LCW+14]. It is expected that the used intensities show a rather smooth evolution with
increasing distance, however, different behavior is seen. This might result from the optimisation routine
where a stopping criteria is met too soon, for instance a maximum number of iterations or a local maxima
with zero gradient. This can result in a sub-optimal solution and can be overcome by more strict stopping
criteria. Despite these artifacts, the found key-rate is higher than obtained in [LCW+14]. Furthermore,
secure key material can be extracted for longer distances.
6.2 Finite intensities, finite key size
In this regime we consider the effects of increasing the number of sent pulses N on the key-rate while
preserving the baseline settings of Section 6.1 including m = 3. As we include finite key-effects, we have
to fix certain cryptographic security parameters. We want to achieve a certain security of our protocol and
we want it to be correct with high probability. Therefore, we fix the security and correctness parameters
as sec = cor = 2
−50. Furthermore, we take the abort probability to be pabort = 2−50. Consequently, we
fix Cl,X = 
C
l,Z = 
H
µj ,X
= Hµj ,X = 
H
µj ,E
= 2−60. This gives upper bounds for e ≤ 2−54 and X ≤ 2−55 and
we set 1 = 2 = 3 = 2
−55. Combined this gives  ≤ 2−52, which matches with our constraint sec ≥ ,
obtained from Equation (39). The linear programs given in Section 4.1 bound the number of usable pulses
and photon errors, but contain an infinite number of variables. We refer to Appendix B for the truncation
of the infinite sums of Section 4.1.
For the chosen security parameter sec it is sufficient to upper bound multi photon pulses to at most 20
photons. Indeed, 20 is a sufficiently large upper bound on the number of photons per pulse: Let X be Poisson
distributed with rate µ. According to [Sho13, Corollary 6], the Poisson tail probability may be bounded by
P (X ≥ x | µ = 1) ≤ min
(
e−DKL(µ,x)
2
,
e−DKL(µ,x)√
2piDKL(µ, x)
)
, for x > µ, (45)
where DKL(µ, x) is the Kullback–Leibler divergence between two Poisson distributed random variables with
respective means µ and x:
DKL(µ, x) = µ− x+ x ln
(
x
µ
)
. (46)
Using the bound from Equation (45), we can show that
P (X ≥ 20 | µ = 1) < 2−63.03 < 2−60. (47)
We consider the key-rate for N = 10i pulses, for i ∈ {7, . . . , 11} and we consider the limit N → ∞.
The results are shown in Figure 2. The same channel and detector parameters are used as in the baseline.
We observe that with increasing number of pulses, the expected secure key-rate indeed increases. Note that
already for 1011 pulses, our key-rate estimation approaches the asymptotic key rate quite well.
6.3 Asymptotic key size, varying number of intensity settings
In this experimental regime we vary the number of intensity settings, for m ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} while preserving
the baseline settings of Section 6.1 including N → ∞. We also include the fully asymptotic regime, where
m → ∞, and N → ∞. We refer to Appendix C.2 for the unknown parameter estimation in this fully
asymptotic case. The key-rate results are presented in Figures 3a and 3b. We observe that while using only
two intensities, the key-rate quickly drops. However, for more than two intensities, the results are very close
to each other. Therefore, we focus on the 190-202 km range in Figure 3b. Here we observe that with each
additional intensity, more key-material can be extracted. However, we also see that the gains are marginal.
Already for three intensities, distances up to 193 km can be covered, with key-rate ∼ 10−7. Using more
intensity settings gives only a minor increase in maximum distance and a slightly higher key-rate for the
same channel lengths. In the limit m→∞, the maximum distance for safely executing the protocol may be
bounded by 201 km with a key-rate of about 5 · 10−8.
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Figure 2: The secure key-rate obtained in terms of the length of the fiber optic
channel link (km). For a varying number of pulses.
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Figure 3: The secure key-rate obtained in terms of the length of the fiber optic
channel link (km) for varying number of intensities m.
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A Notation
Variable Domain Description
N Z≥0 Number of pulses sent by Alice
X {X,Z} Basis
U {µ0, . . . , µm} Intensities
n Z≥0 Number of pulses in which Alice and Bob chose
the same basis and Bob registered an detection
E Z≥0 Number of errors
e [0, 1/2] Error rate
µ R≥0 Pulse intensity (mean photon number)
p [0, 1] Probability
` Z≥0 Length of the secret key (in bits)
R [0, 1] Secret key rate
Kr {0, 1}N Raw key
Ks {0, 1}ns Sifted key
Ke {0, 1}nX Error corrected key
K {0, 1}` Secure key
Table 1: Overview of the most important variables. Subscripts are used to con-
dition on events such as basis, intensity or photon number. Superscripts indicate
whether the key is Alice’s (a) or Bob’s (b)
B Linear programs with finite number of variables
The linear programs given in Section 4.1 contain an infinite number of variables. To reduce the number of
variables we truncate the infinite sums at M and upper-bound the number of pulses containing more than
M photons,
mM,X =
∞∑
l=M+1
nl,X . (48)
Namely note that,
e−µjpµj |X
M∑
l=0
µlj
l!
nl,X
pl|X
≤ e−µjpµj |X
∞∑
l=0
µlj
l!
nl,X
pl|X
≤ mM,X + e−µjpµj |X
M∑
l=0
µlj
l!
nl,X
pl|X
. (49)
Hence, these inequalities allow us to bound the infinite sum by two finite sums.
Let qM,X be the probability that a X -pulse contains more than M photons, i.e.
qM,X =
m∑
j=0
pµj |X e
−µj
∞∑
l=M+1
µlj
l!
. (50)
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For
ΛM,X := qM,XNX + f (NX ; qM,X ; M,X ) , (51)
it follows, by Chernoff’s bound, that
P (mM,X ≥ ΛM,X ) ≤ M,X , (52)
for all M,X > 0. Hence solving the linear programs of Equations (54), (55) and (56), that contain a finite
number of variables, will allow us to compute the length `∗ of the secret key,
`∗ := n∗0,1,X − nX (h(eX) + δec (pabort, nX))− log2
(
2
cor(23(sec − ))2
)
, (53)
for some 1, 2, 3 > 0 and  = 21 + 2 + 3 + e + X + M,X + M,Z .
n∗1,Z = min n1,Z ,
s.t. nµj ,Z + δµj ≥ e−µjpµj |Z
M∑
l=0
µlj
l!
nl,Z
pl|Z
, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
nµj ,Z + δµj ≤ e−µjpµj |Z
M∑
l=0
µlj
l!
nl,Z
pl|Z
+ ΛM,Z , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
m∑
j=0
δµj = 0,
0 ≤ nl,Z ≤ min
(
pl|ZNZ + f(NZ ; pl|Z ; Cl,Z), nZ
)
, ∀0 ≤ l ≤M,∣∣δµj ∣∣ ≤√− ln(Hµj ,Z/2)nZ/2, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
nl,Z , δµj ∈ R, ∀0 ≤ l ≤M, 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
(54)
E∗1,Z = max E1,Z
s.t. Eµj ,Z + δµj ≥ e−µjpµj |Z
M∑
l=0
µlj
l!
El,Z
pl|Z
, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
Eµj ,Z + δµj ≤ e−µjpµj |Z
M∑
l=0
µlj
l!
El,Z
pl|Z
+ ΛM,Z , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
m∑
j=0
δµj = 0,
0 ≤ El,Z ≤ min
(
pl|ZNZ + f(NZ ; pl|Z ; Cl,Z), EZ
)
, ∀0 ≤ l ≤M,∣∣δµj ∣∣ ≤√− ln(Hµj ,e/2)EZ/2, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
El,Z , δµj ∈ R, ∀0 ≤ l ≤M, 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
(55)
17
n∗0,1,X = min n0,X + n1,X − n1,Xh(e∗1,Z + δ(nX , nZ , 1)),
s.t. nµj ,X + δµj ≥ e−µjpµj |X
M∑
l=0
µlj
l!
nl,X
pl|X
, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
nµj ,X + δµj ≤ e−µjpµj |X
M∑
l=0
µlj
l!
nl,X
pl|X
+ ΛM,X , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
m∑
j=0
δµj = 0,
0 ≤ nl,X ≤ min
(
pl|ZNX + f(NX ; pl|X ; Cl,X), nX
)
, ∀0 ≤ l ≤M,∣∣δµj ∣∣ ≤√− ln(Hµj ,X/2)nX/2, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
nl,X , δµj ∈ R, ∀0 ≤ l ≤M, 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
(56)
C Asymptotic case
In the asymptotic limit, i.e. when N →∞, the Serfling, Hoeffding and Chernoff terms vanish and the linear
programs simplify significantly. In this section the asymptotic linear programs are presented. First, the case
with a finite amount of decoy states is presented. Subsequently, we consider the case where the number of
decoy intensities m goes to infinity as well. In this case the linear programs can be omitted entirely.
C.1 Finite number of decoy intensities
Let us first define the yields Yl,X and the gains Qµj ,X ,
Yl,X :=
nl,X
pl|XNX
, ∀l ≥ 0,X ∈ {X,Z},
Qµj ,X :=
nµj ,X
pµj |XNX
, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,X ∈ {X,Z}.
(57)
In addition, we define the following variables,
γl,Z := el,ZYl,Z =
El,ZYl,Z
nl,Z
=
El,Z
pl|ZNZ
, ∀l ≥ 0,
γµj ,Z := eµj ,ZQµj ,Z =
Eµj ,ZQµj ,Z
nµj ,Z
=
Eµj ,Z
pµj |ZNZ
, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m.
(58)
Substituting the above variables in Equations (32), (33) and (37) results in the following linear programs,
where e∗1,Z :=
γ∗1,Z
Y ∗1,Z
.
Y ∗1,Z = min Y1,Z ,
s.t. Qµj ,Z = e
−µj
∞∑
l=0
µlj
l!
Yl,Z , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
0 ≤ Yl,Z ≤ 1, ∀l ≥ 0.
(59)
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γ∗1,Z = max γ1,Z
s.t. γµj ,Z = e
−µj
∞∑
l=0
µlj
l!
γl,Z , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
0 ≤ γl,Z ≤ 1, ∀l ≥ 0.
(60)
Y ∗0,1,X = min p0|XY0,X + p1|XY1,X
(
1− h(e∗1,Z)
)
,
s.t. Qµj ,X = e
−µj
∞∑
l=0
µlj
l!
Yl,X , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ m,
0 ≤ Yl,X ≤ 1, ∀l ≥ 0.
(61)
Solving these linear programs results in a secure key-rate
R∗ = Y ∗0,1,X −QXh(eX). (62)
In linear program 61, we have used the fact that the sifting probability pX can be taken arbitrarily close
to 1.
C.2 Infinite number of decoy intensities
If, in addition, we assume an infinite amount of decoy intensities (i.e. m → ∞) then, for properly chosen
intensities, the linear programs can be shown to posses a single feasible solution. Hence, Alice and Bob can
in this case compute the exact yields and error rates. The resulting key rate can therefore be computed as
follows,
R∗ = p0|XY0,X + p1|XY1,X (1− h(e1,Z))−QXh(eX). (63)
The sifting probabilities p0|X and p1|X depend on the intensities, which are chosen to maximize the key
rate.
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